From J. A. Lauwerys (ed) Scandinavian Democracy: Development of Democratic Thought and Institutions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Copenhagen: Schultz (1958), pp. 48-57.

Eastern and Western Interpretation

Postwar developments in eastern Europe under Soviet Russian influence have revealed with dreadful clarity that East and West attach different meanings to the word democracy. Clearly the Eastern interpretation of the term is not incompatible with a government under which the opposition is persecuted and its leaders jailed, traditional democratic liberties swept aside and only a certain party or parties tolerated.

This usage rather unusual by our standards, should not however, have taken the Western powers completely by surprise. As early as 1936, when the Soviet Constitution was promulgated, Stalin said, "I admit that the new constitution upholds the regime of the proletarian dictatorship." Yet in the same breath he was able to call this constitution "the only perfect democratic constitution in the world". To the Western mind, democratic dictatorship is a complete contradiction in terms. One might say that while to us democracy means government by the people, to the Russian it is government for the people. The Western interpretation stresses the how of political action -namely, through freely elected popular bodies and based on free speech and party activity; that is, through legalized procedure.

The Russians stress the content or purpose of political measures. To them the decisive issues are economic in nature. They regard a society as democratic to the extent that it is anti-capitalist and bent on achieving economic equality for the masses - that it approaches what we would call a socialist society. Anyone, of course, may use words as he pleases provided his meaning is clear. But it is precisely clarity of meaning that is lacking in this case. Communist terminology is in reality an attempt to profit from the good will evoked by the democratic ideal and from the suggestive power it has inherited from the French Revolution. The Communists disown these ideas but would like to appropriate the prestige and dynamism attached, to them. It is reassuring to hear that the Russians too are fighting for "democracy". Those who fail to see through such word magic may get the impression that, though there may be some difference in the way the term is applied, East and West are ultimately united in the same great aim. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Terminology should distinguish clearly between political method or form of government on one hand and its content or purpose on the other, especially where economic matters are concerned. To mix these concepts, or to use the same term for both, is demagogic dishonesty. The Communists use the term democracy to describe a certain formal constitutional order just as we do. They do so for the simple reason that the word has always been used in this sense and because, apart from simple translations like "popular government", it has no equivalent in current terminology. On the other hand, there does exist another word to describe a social order which attempts to regulate economic factors in favor of the majority and on an anti-capitalist basis. The word is socialism.

Form and Content of Government

Therefore, in the interest of clarity it is important to distinguish between democracy and socialism, form and content. In other words, we shall follow traditional Western terminology according to which democracy is a form of political government and not an economic policy. In doing so, of course, we intimate nothing about the relative importance or value of the two concepts. One can be a democrat without being a socialist and vice versa. It is also possible to be both at the same time - i.e., a social-democrat. Should democracy and socialism prove incompatible - which I think unlikely - social-democrats will have to make up their minds as to which they value more highly, democracy or socialism.

The objection that to distinguish between political and economic content is to conceal their intimate connection is even less tenable. Clarification conceals nothing, far from vitiating the problem, it helps to present it clearly and openly. Moreover, there is by no means full agreement regarding the functional relationship between political form and economic structure. In any case it would be is absurd not to distinguish between these concepts, however intimately and inseparably connected, as it would be to confuse "moon" and "tide", or "thunder" and "lightning".

In our usage, therefore, the word democracy, as applied to governments, denotes a certain constitutional or organizational form, a method for expressing the "public will" or exercising "public authority". Democracy is popular government with the administration or governing power residing in the people as a whole rather than in one person or small group. 

On reflection, however, these concepts appear not quite clear and precise. Difficulties arise when we begin to examine the two constituents of the definition, "the people" and "the government". We soon discover that neither denotes a well-defined factor which clearly distinguishes democracy from other forms of government.

Let us first examine what is meant by "the power" or "the government" of a democratic state residing in the people. "The government", in this context, is merely a collective term for action by public authorities: legislative, executive, and judicial. But in actual fact it is not the whole people who decide which laws shall be enacted or how a criminal shall be punished. Such authority is vested jointly in Parliament and the King, the police and the courts. What, then. Is meant by the statement that in a democratic state the authority exercised by these institutions resides in "the people as a whole"?

Representation and Delegated Authority

The answer is: representation and delegated authority. The executive and judiciary are subordinate to the legislative which is the highest political authority in the state. This body in turn derives its authority from the will of those it represents, i.e., the people. Thus in the final analysis all state power originates in the people. Under present conditions representation in Denmark rests on regularly held elections to Parliament. But it is possible to imagine a period of gradual transition with increasing intervals between elections, or even a mandate for life. Likewise, we can imagine the number of representatives reduced to a single person. To take the extreme case, we then have a form of government under which the people have delegated their highest authority once and for all to a single person and his descendants, according to certain rules. We may still speak of democracy, since the people can still be regarded as the ultimate or dejure holders of "sovereignty".

It is this interpretation of representation and delegation of power that was underlying the Fascist and Nazi pretense of democracy. Pointing to a more or less real or fictitious delegation of power, they claimed that the dictator represented the people. Why should the people not choose to be represented by one person for life rather than several persons for four years? Obviously, the problem requires further clarification. Instead of thinking in terms of semi-mystical powers, we should try to get at the real legal and functional factors behind the concepts of representation and power delegation. The concept of representation is valid only in so far as the 'representatives' power to act is legally restricted by the wishes of the represented, and to the extend that the represented are able to ensure by legal means that their wishes are represented.

This principle proxy, which has provided the model for this line of thought. The person who gives these powers instructs his proxy how to act; and there are certain legal means by which he can ensure that the proxy does in fact follow his instructions. To apply the same principle to the state would mean that the people prescribe certain political rules to be observed by their representative in the performance of his task. It would also mean setting up methods of control by which the people could at any time satisfy themselves that their instructions were obeyed. It is easy to imagine a sliding scale illustrating a diminishing degree of effective representation.

Take, for instance, a case where the mandated representative is given full freedom, except that he is subject to control at any time, either by making the representative responsible under the law or by providing the people with discretionary powers to dismiss him if he fails to act in accordance with their wishes. Such control may be enforceable at certain times only. The more infrequent and less clearly defined the opportunity for control, the farther we get from the ideal of true representation. At the bottom of the scale are dictatorships and absolute monarchies, where the mandate is either purely fictitious or given once and for all without restriction and where the people have no opportunity of exercising any control at all. To sum up: the realities underlying the concept of representation may differ considerably from case to case. The difference lies in the degree effectiveness with which the people are able to bring their influence to bear.

Limitation of Power

The statement that in a democracy "power" resides in the people could be illustrated by another scale representing the extent to which in certain areas of government the people are displaced by, or must share their power with, other political forces. We get a pure case when legislative and executive as well as judicial controlled by the people. This controlling power might be restricted by including non-popular elements in the legislative, by a non-popular executive exercising power independently of or in competition with a popular legislative body, or by a combination of both these factors.

The first case occurs when a popularly elected representation has to share legislative power with a King. Under a parliamentary system such an arrangement is purely a matter of form and has no political reality. A similar instance is that of a legislative body divided into two chambers, one of which is aristocratic in character, on the basis of birth or voting privileges. The second kind of restrictive influence is present when the King (government) has the power to prescribe certain legal measures (prerogatives) or to undertake other acts of government independent of parliamentary authorization.

A privileged upper chamber and an independent executive are two factors which in modern history have been opposed to democracy. The struggle for a parliamentary system meant democratizing the executive and subordinating it to popular representation. Efforts to democratize the legislative found expression in the struggle against the upper chamber. Only when both objectives have been reached is democracy complete in the sense that the people's will reigns supreme.

The lower executive organs and the judiciary play a less important role. These institutions are by their nature subordinate to the legislative authorities and in themselves are not normally - or only to a limited extent - political factors of any importance. Consequently, popular control of the legislature usually ensures indirect control of the administration and the courts. A purer form of democracy results when the people have direct authority over these institutions by means of appointment and control. This becomes articularly important when popular control over legislative and executive power is limited. The introduction of appointed lay justices in the courts indicates a trend in this direction.

The Electorate

Finally we may ask what is meant by the statement that the people as a whole must be invested with political power? Here, too, we may have every possible transitional form. The logical extreme - a situation where everybody without exception is entitled to vote and to be elected - would be impracticable. A minimum of mental maturity must be required (minimum voting age). Again, we can gradually depart from pure democracy by the progressive exclusion of various social groups, or by modifying the relative values of votes. It cannot, however, be assumed that the undemocratic character of a system is directly proportional to the number of potential voters who are denied franchise. The deciding factor is the political implication of disfranchisement. For instance, it would be more undemocratic to deny the vote to all persons with an income below a certain minimum than to exclude women, even though these might constitute the larger group. The exclusion of women would admittedly be arbitrary and unreasonable, since it rests on the false assumption that women are not qualified citizens, that they lack the ability and interest required of those who concern themselves with politics. But the distinction between man and woman is by no means as relevant politically as a discrimination based on income.

lt has been shown above that it is impossible to define the concept of democracy in terms of "either-or". Consequently, it cannot be said that a system is democratic when power resides in the people. It is better to say that a state is democratic in proportion to the amount of power residing in the people.

The foregoing may be summarized as follows: the democratic factor - the people's influence on the exercise of public authority may vary in:

1. Intensity - i. e., the breadth of the eligible electorate. At the one extreme we have equal and universal adult franchise. The more a democratic system departs from this pure extreme the more does it approach an oligarchy. The very restricted suffrage which prevailed in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is a case in point.
   
2. Effectiveness:- i. e., the degree to which the people succeed in making their wishes effective. Effectiveness is at a maximum in a straight democracy where all matters are decided by direct vote. In a system based on representation, effectiveness depends upon the extent of popular control over the representatives or instruments of policy; and this in turn depends chiefly on the length of the intervals at which such control is exercised (length of term of office). If control is weak, democracy becomes merely nominal in the sense that power, although exercised in the name of the people through delegation or representation, rests in reality with the representatives rather than with those represented. This, for instance, is the case in the Soviet Union. The undemocratic factor there is not that the represented body is limited, but that it lacks control over its representatives. The Soviet Union, therefore, is undemocratic in a different way from nineteenth-century England.
   
3. Extent - i.e. the number of government organs under popular control. Extent is greatest where the people control not only the legislative, but the executive and judicial powers as well. Where popular control is only partial, democracy becomes more or less restricted. A typical example is the hereditary monarchy where legislative power is controlled jointly by the monarchy and aristocracy, and the executive by the monarchy.
   

Democracy and Freedom

Democracy therefore depends on a number of freedoms, such as freedom of the press or the right of free organization and legal security. Without these guarantees, elections become little more than hoodwinking, of the type so familiar in totalitarian countries.

To sum up, we might say that a government is democratic to the extent that, by means of a broadly based and equal right to vote and hold public office, it allows the people free and effective control ver the exercise of political power in all its ramifications. So far, this attempt at definition has been confined to the concept democracy as a certain form of political government. Undoubtedly this is the essential meaning of the word. Having made this clear, we may ask ourselves whether the concept may not be extended to cover related situations without losing its basic content.

The Democratic Way of Life

First, it is obvious that the concept may be applied to human groups which, like the state, have organized leadership. We may speak of democratic (or autocratic) institutions, such as clubs, stock companies, political parties, trade unions, religious organizations, educational institutions, endowed foundations and similar bodies with an organized leadership authorized to act on behalf of the group. Leadership may be more or less democratic, according to the members' greater or lesser powers of decision and consultation.

The army has always been one of the most autocratic of institutions. The private soldier's life is one of discipline and absolute obedience; the general is as infallible as the Pope. Although such an institution is not absolutely incompatible with a democratic mentality, it is an element which, in a society dominated by the army, may have a markedly destructive or retarding influence upon political democracy. The officers' regime in Prussia was one of the worst enemies of growing German democracy. The idea of introducing democratic institutions into the army - in the form of representatives of noncommissioned personnel with negotiating powers - must, at least in theory, be welcomed in a democratic state. Similarly, student councils are manifestations of democratic tendencies in organizations otherwise chiefly autocratic in character. 

As a rule joint stock companies and most clubs are purely democratic institutions. We can distinguish between as many different kinds of institutional democracy (or autocracy) as there are types of organization, - political, academic, military and so on. The state itself could be considered a special type of institutional democracy. A particularly important form is industrial democracy, which upholds the right of wage earners and salaried employees to a share in the management and in the determination of working conditions. Going a step further, we may apply the concept of democracy to any association involving leadership, or power over individuals with or without formal management or legal organization. In such a case, we might speak of psychological democracy insofar as it is animated by the same spirit as political democracy.

An analysis of the foundations of political democracy lies outside the scope of this article. For the sake of completeness, however, a brief indication of their context must be given. The basic feature of the democratic mentality is respect for the moral personality of the individual. It is an attitude deeply rooted in Christian and humanist tradition. Christianity has expressed it in the doctrine of Man's infinite worth in the eyes of God. Kant has formulated the same idea philosophically in his categorical imperative which demands that one should always regard humanity, in oneself and in others, as an end as well as a means. At the opposite pole we find that contempt for the individual which is the essence of fascism. Anti-humanism breaks down every barrier between man and the inanimate. It leads consistently to concentration camps, gas chambers and giant crematoria. To a mind which has rejected the idea of the sacredness of human life, these things are nothing more than an expedient technique for destroying enemies. Lack of respect for man is a characteristic of all forms of autocracy.

A special aspect of the respect for the moral personality of the individual is the recognition of his autonomy, of his right to self-determination. Complete individual autonomy, of course, is incompatible with social order, but the closest possible approximation is attained by acceptance of the majority principle. This in turn implies government by consent and cooperation rather than control through intimidation. In its widest sense, the principle of free political discussion as a way of achieving mutual understanding and compromise is thus applied to spiritual matters. Spiritual freedom, however, is dependent on personal security based on respect for law and order rather than arbitrariness and brute force.

Let us now consider a few examples of non-political democracy. The parent-child relationship, for instance, may be based on autocratic or democratic principles. In the former case, authority, especially the father's, is used to enforce obedient submission and discipline. The child is regarded as a thing to be shaped, not in its own spirit, but in the image of its parents, a willing and passive means of realizing their objectives. There is no discussion, no appeal to the child's understanding, but an abundance of commands and force, physical as well as spiritual.

Democratically oriented education on the other hand respects the child's own personality and strives to provide the best possible conditions for his development. It stimulates independent action and judgment; an effort is made to reach agreement and understanding by explanation and rational discussion. Compulsion and force are employed as little as possible. The democratic parent, like a gardener, prunes the tree only to enable it to grow stronger and yield more fruit. His aim is to render himself superfluous as soon as possible, to bring up a free and responsible individual capable of taking his fate into his own hands.